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ABSTRACT
Political campaigns are increasingly turning to digital advertising
to reach voters. It is predicted that, during the 2020 U.S. presidential
elections, 28% of political marketing spending will go to online
advertising, compared to 20% in 2018 and 0.2% in 2010. Digital
advertising platforms’ popularity is partially explained by how they
empower advertisers to target messages to platform users with
great precision, including through inferences about those users’
political affiliations. However, prior work has shown that platforms’
ad delivery algorithms can selectively deliver adswithin these target
audiences in ways that can lead to demographic skews along race
and gender lines, often without an advertiser’s knowledge.
In this study, we investigate the impact of Facebook’s ad deliv-
ery algorithms on political ads. We run a series of political ads on
Facebook—one of the world’s largest advertising platforms—and
measure how Facebook delivers those ads to different groups, de-
pending on an ad’s content (e.g., the political viewpoint featured)
and targeting criteria. We find that Facebook’s ad delivery algo-
rithms effectively differentiate the price of reaching a user based
on their inferred political alignment with the advertised content,
inhibiting political campaigns’ ability to reach voters with diverse
political views. This effect is most acute when advertisers use small
budgets, as Facebook’s delivery algorithm tends to preferentially
deliver to the users who are, according to Facebook’s estimation,
most relevant. Moreover, due to how Facebook currently reports ad
performance, this effect may be invisible to political campaigns.
Our findings point to advertising platforms’ potential role in
political polarization and creating informational filter bubbles. We
show that Facebook preferentially exposes users to political ad-
vertising that it believes is relevant for them, even when other
advertisers with opposing viewpoints may be actively trying to
reach them. Furthermore, some large ad platforms have recently
changed their policies to restrict the targeting tools they offer to
political campaigns; our findings show that such reforms will be
insufficient if the goal is to ensure that political ads are shown to
users of diverse political views. Counterintuitively, advertisers who
target broad audiences may end up ceding platforms even more in-
fluence over which users ultimately see which ads, adding urgency
to calls for more meaningful public transparency into the political
advertising ecosystem.
∗ These two authors contributed equally.
1 INTRODUCTION
Political campaigns spend millions of dollars on ads to get their
message out to voters. Recently, much of that spending has mi-
grated from traditional broadcast media (e.g, television, radio, and
newspapers) to the Internet in the form of digital advertising. A
recent study [40] predicts that during 2020, political ad spending
overall will top $9.9B, with over $2.8B of that being paid to digital
ad platforms.
Facebook, one of the world’s largest advertising platforms, earns
a significant portion of this revenue from candidates at the national,
state, and local levels. The company has a dedicated site for political
campaigns [17] which states [18]:
Facebook advertising can help you deliver a message
directly to constituents so you can better understand
and engage with them on issues they care most about.
According to Facebook’s Ad Library [14], political campaigns have
spent over $907M on Facebook ads worldwide since May 2018,
with the Trump campaign alone currently spending over $1M each
week [47]. Furthermore, a recent study found that, at the state level,
"more than 10 times as many candidates advertise on Facebook than
advertise on TV" [25]. This adoption reflects the fact that social
media platforms have substantially lowered the cost of advertising,
expanding the number of campaigns who can feasibly reach voters
through digital channels [25]. Given the growing importance of
online ads to the political discourse, it is critical to understand how
complex ad platforms like Facebook operate in practice.
Much attention has been had to the ad creation and targeting
phase, where the advertiser selects their desired audience and up-
loads their ad creative. Researchers have shown that advanced
targeting features on ad platforms can be used to prevent certain
ethnic groups from seeing ads [15, 46]. For example, in 2016, the
Trump campaign used these techniques to carry out "major voter
suppression operations" aimed at lowering turnout among young
women and black voters [27], and there is evidence that Russian
organizations used these tools interfere with 2016 U.S. presidential
elections [42, 49].
However, there is a less well-understood aspect of modern ad
platforms that may be playing an equally important role: The al-
gorithms that ad platforms use to decide which ads get delivered
to which users. Recent work [4] has shown that an ad platform’s
choices during the ad delivery phase—rooted in the desire to show
relevant ads to users, ostensibly to provide users with a “better expe-
rience” [43, 44]—can lead to dramatic skew in delivery along gender
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and racial lines, even when the advertiser aims to reach gender-
and race-balanced audiences. In other words, an ad platform may
deliver ads to a skewed subset of the advertiser’s targeted audi-
ence based on the content of the ad alone, and do so unbeknownst
to—and out of the control of—both the users and the advertisers.
As far as we are aware, we are the first to study whether such
skews are introduced for political ads on real-world advertising
platforms due to the ad delivery phase alone. We focus on Facebook
because of its critical importance to today’s digital political adver-
tising. We hypothesize that that Facebook may choose to deliver
ads only to the subset of the political campaign’s target audience
that it predicts will be aligned with a campaign’s views, despite
attempts by the campaign to reach a diverse range of voters, and
that this practice might play a role in political polarization by cre-
ating informational filter bubbles. Specifically, we seek to answer:
Is a political campaign advertising on Facebook able to reach all of
the electorate? Or, is Facebook preferentially delivering ads to users
who it believes are more likely to be aligned with the campaign’s
political views? Additionally, does Facebook vary ad pricing based on
its hypothesized match between the target audience and campaign’s
political views?
These questions are particularly urgent in light of the debate
unfolding over the “microtargeting” of political ads. In late October
2019, Twitter decided to change its policy and ban all political
advertising on its platform [48]. In response, U.S. Federal Election
Commission (FEC) Chair Ellen Weintraub publicly argued that
instead of banning such ads, ad platforms should limit political
advertisers’ ability to narrowly target ads to ensure that "a broad
public can hear the speech and respond" [54]. Shortly after, Google
announced that it will significantly limit election ad targeting in
order to "promote increased visibility of election ads" [26]. At the
time of this writing, Facebook is considering reforms of its own ad
platform, but details are sparse [16].
Our questions regarding ad delivery are important to these de-
velopments for at least two reasons. First, skews resulting from ad
delivery can raise fundamentally similar concerns to those raised
about narrow targeting: an electorate who cannot “hear and re-
spond” to political speech. Second, ad delivery algorithms might
counteract the goals of restricting microtargeting by redirecting
ads according to the choices of the ad platforms (in spite of broader
target audiences). Policymakers must be alert to these implications.
To test our hypotheses, we became a political advertiser and ran
over $13K1 of political ads under controlled conditions, and ob-
served how Facebook’s algorithms delivered them. Unfortunately,
Facebook makes it difficult to understand ad delivery along axes
of political affiliation; to measure these results, we had to design
careful experiments. First, we needed to determine which users Face-
book was delivering our ads to, and whether skew (along political
lines) exists among these users. We re-used techniques published
in prior work [4, 46], using proxies based on ground-truth data
from the voter records and political donation records. Addition-
ally, we created audiences according to their political leaning—as
inferred by Facebook—and used them simultaneously as part of an
ad campaign but in a way that we can explicitly see the delivery to
each subgroup. Second, we needed to determine if it is possible for
1Throughout the paper we refer to prices in U.S. Dollars.
a candidate to reach their entire audience. We used long-running
ads, along with the Facebook-provided limits on how frequently a
given set of ads can be shown to a user, to “force” the platform to
consider delivering our ads to all of our targeted users. This way,
we were able to “exhaust” the audience to determine how much of
it the platform will allow a given message to be shown to. Third,
we needed to determine how we were being charged for delivering
ads to different sub-populations of the target audience. We used
Facebook’s advertising reporting features, combined with proxies,
in order to understand how our budget is split across users with
different political leanings.
Contributions After running our ads and analyzing the results,
we present the following contributions:
First, we show that, despite identical targeting parameters, budgets,
and competition from other advertisers, the content of a political
ad alone can significantly affect which users Facebook will show
the ad to. For example, we find Facebook delivers our ads with
content from Democratic campaigns to over 65% users registered
as Democrats, while delivering ads from Republican campaigns to
under 40% users registered as Democrats, despite identical target-
ing parameters. Moreover, our “control” ads with neutral political
content that are run at the same time are delivered to a much more
balanced audience (47% Democrats), showing that preferentially
delivery is a result of Facebook’s ad delivery algorithm.
Second, we find that this effect is surprisingly not present when we
target users who donated to political campaigns, rather than those
who are registered for a given political party.
Third, we find that that the delivery skew is present to an even
greater degree when we use Facebook’s own political targeting fea-
tures. For example, when we target an audience of users who Face-
book believes have “Likely engagement with US political content
(Liberal)”, combined with an equal-sized audience who Facebook
considers to have “Likely engagement with US political content
(Conservative)”, we find that our ads from Democratic campaigns
deliver to over 60% liberal users (compared to ads from Republican
campaigns, which deliver to 25% liberal users).
Fourth, we find that it can be difficult and more expensive for po-
litical campaigns to have their content delivered to those who
Facebook believes are not aligned with the campaign’s views. For
example, when re-running ads for Bernie Sanders (a liberal candi-
date) and Donald Trump (a conservative candidate), we find that
when targeting an audience of conservative users, in the first day
of the ad campaign, Facebook delivers our Sanders ad to only 4,772
users, while our Trump ad is delivered to 7,588 users.2 We find
that the underlying reason is that our Sanders ads targeting con-
servative users are charged significantly more by Facebook than
our Trump ads ($15.39 versus $10.98 for 1,000 impressions), despite
being run from the same ad account, at the same time.3 Moreover,
the difference cannot be attributed to some unknown underlying
difference in liberal and conservative users’ use of Facebook, as
our neutral ad targeting the same audiences and run at the same
time is delivered much more uniformly, reaching 6,822 liberal and
2We find a similar, but flipped, effect if we target an audience of liberal users.
3Again, we see a similar, flipped effect when targeting liberal users.
6,584 conservative users at a cost of $12.07 and $12.65 for 1,000
impressions, respectively.
Fifth, we find that when an ad creative and landing page shown
to the users is neutral, but we “trick" Facebook’s algorithm into
believing the ad leads to a page with content taken from a particular
candidate’s campaignweb site, the skews in delivery and differential
pricing are also present. This suggests that the ad delivery decisions
made by Facebook are not driven exclusively by user reactions to
the ad (as all such ads appeared identical to the users), but instead
are made at least partially a priori by Facebook itself.
Taken together, our results indicate that Facebook preferentially
shows users political ads whose content it predicts are aligned
with their political views, with negative implications for both users
and campaigns. For users, such delivery limits users’ exposure
to diverse viewpoints and—if Facebook’s inference is incorrect—
may pigeonhole them into a particular slice of political ads. For
campaigns, such delivery may inhibit them from reaching beyond
their existing “base” on Facebook, as getting ads delivered to users
the platform believes are not aligned with their views may become
prohibitively expensive. Importantly, these effects may be occurring
without users’ or campaigns’ knowledge or control.
Stepping back, our findings raise serious concerns about whether
Facebook and similar ad platforms are, in fact, amplifying polit-
ical filter bubbles by economically disincentivizing content they
believe are not aligned with users’ political views. Put simply, Face-
book is making decisions about which ads to show to which users
based on its own priorities (presumably, user engagement with or
value for the platform). But in the context of political advertising,
Facebook’s choice may have significant negative externalities on
political discourse in society at large.
Ethics All of our experiments were conducted with careful con-
sideration of ethics. First, we obtained Institutional Review Board
review of our study, with our protocol being marked as “Exempt”.
We did not collect any users’ personally identifying information
from Facebook, and did not collect any information about users
who visited our site after clicking on our ads. Second, we minimized
harm to Facebook users when running our ads by only running
“real” ads, i.e., if a user clicked on one of our ads, they were brought
to a real-world page not under our control that was relevant to
the topic of the ad. In the few cases where the ads pointed to a
domain we controlled, the visiting users were automatically and
immediately redirected to a real page that we did not control. Third,
we minimized harm to Facebook itself by participating in their ad-
vertising system as any other advertiser would and paying for all of
our ads. We registered as an advertiser in the area of “Social Issues,
Elections or Politics” [3], meaning our ads were subject to the same
review as the ads of other political campaigns. Fourth, we mini-
mized the risk of altering the political discourse through careful
choices of the ad content (Section 4.2), and running approximately
the same number of copies of ads for Republican and Democratic
candidates, with the same budgets. The total amount we spent on
political advertising while collecting data for this paper ($13.7K)
is minuscule compared to the ad budgets of real campaigns in the
same period (likely in the millions of dollars [14]).
Limitations It is important to note the limitations of our study
(see Section 5.3 for a detailed discussion). Most importantly, we
can only report results of our own ads; we are unable to make any
statements about the extent to which any effects we observe exist
for political ads run by real political campaigns, or political ads in
general. However, the fact that we observe statistically significant
skews in our small set of ads suggests that the effects we observed
are likely present in the delivery of other political ads as well.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
background on Facebook’s advertising platform and Section 3 de-
tails related work. Section 4 gives an overview of our methodology,
and Section 5 presents the results of our experiments. Section 6
offers a concluding discussion.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide some basic background about Face-
book’s advertising platform, the subject of this study, necessary to
understand our methodology (described in Section 4).
2.1 Overview
On Facebook, like many ad platforms, there are two phases to
advertising: ad creation and ad delivery.
Ad creation Ad creation refers to the process by which an ad-
vertiser submits their ad to the Facebook ad platform. During this
stage, advertisers provide the contents of the ad (the images, videos,
text, and destination link collectively called the ad creative), and
specify the target audience of users on the platform to whom they
wish the ad to be shown (see §2.2). Advertisers often run many ads
that are related; collectively, these are called an ad campaign. Before
submitting their ad campaign, advertisers also specify an objective
(i.e., what they want to achieve with the campaign, see §2.3) and
the ad budget they are willing to spend to achieve that objective
(see §2.4). The ads then enter a review process to be approved to
run on the platform (see §2.5).
Ad delivery Ad delivery refers to the process by which the
Facebook ad platform selects which ads get shown to which users.
Before displaying an ad to a user, the platform will hold an ad auc-
tion to determine which ad, from among all ads that user is eligible
to see (by virtue of their inclusion in ads’ target audiences), will
be shown (see §2.6). While the ad campaign is active, the platform
provides a semi-live, detailed breakdown to advertisers of how their
ads are being delivered (see §2.7).
2.2 Targeting
There are many different ways for advertisers to target ads, ranging
from users’ demographics and interests to their personally identifi-
able information (PII) [46, 51]. We briefly describe these below.
Detailed targeting Facebook pioneered, and is continuing to
aggressively market, ways for advertisers to target its users via
user attributes [46]. These attributes cover a variety of aspects of
users’ lives, ranging from demographic features to online activity
and even offline information, often acquired without users’ explicit
consent or knowledge. In the context of politics, Facebook derives
attributes that indicate whether users are “interested in” various
political candidates (e.g., Donald Trump, Elizabeth Warren), as well
as more general attributes about user behaviors, such as “Likely
engagement with US political content (Conservative)" or “Likely
engagement with US political content (Liberal)". The exact method-
ology by which Facebook infers such attributes is not disclosed,
but likely involves profile data provided directly to Facebook, data
from activity on Facebook (e.g., “Liking” Pages or explicit or im-
plicit patterns of interaction with particular content), inferences
based on attributes of a user’s friends, and data inferred from users’
behavior off of Facebook.4
Custom audiences Facebook also allows advertisers to target
users directly using their PII via a tool called Custom Audiences [51].
Using Custom Audiences, advertisers can upload up to 15 different
kinds of PII to Facebook, ranging from names to email addresses
to phone numbers to dates of birth. Facebook then matches these
values against their database in order to build an audience for the
advertiser; the advertiser is then allowed to target their ads to just
the users who match.
2.3 Objective
When creating ad campaigns, advertisers on Facebook are asked to
specify their objective, or what they are trying to achieve. Common
objectives include “Reach" (showing the ad to as many users as
possible), “Traffic" (showing the ad to the users most likely to click),
and “App Installs" (showing the ad to the users most likely to install
the advertiser’s app).
Within each objective, advertisers must also specify an optimiza-
tion, indicating how Facebook should achieve their objective. For
the “Reach" objective, the available optimizations are “Reach" (the
default, showing ads to as many users as possible) and “Impressions"
(showing ads as many times as possible). For the “Traffic" objective,
the available optimizations are “Link Clicks" (the default, showing
ads to the users most likely to click), “Landing Page Views" (show-
ing ads to the users most likely to click and visit the destination
page), “Daily Unique Reach" (showing ads to users most likely to
click, at most per day), and “Impressions" (showing ads to the users
most likely to click, but maximizing the number of impressions).
We hypothesize that political advertisers are likely to com-
monly use the “Reach" campaign objective together with default the
“Reach" optimization—representing the goal of getting theirmessage
out to as many people as possible—and the “Traffic" campaign ob-
jective together with the default “Link Clicks" ad set optimization—
representing the goal of getting as many people as possible to
visit their campaign page. In this paper we use the “Traffic” opti-
mization in exeriments targeting registered voters and donors (see
Section 5.1) and “Reach” optimization in all other experiments.
2.4 Bidding, budgets, and billing
When creating an ad, the advertiser must tell Facebook their bid,
which takes the form of an ad budget. These budgets are either a
daily or lifetime budget for the ad, allowing Facebook to spend the
advertiser’s money between and within auctions according to an
4Recall that Facebook receives information from a variety of sources beyond the
Facebook website and app, including Facebook Pixel tracking [20], app data sharing [9],
third-party data brokers [53], and location data [22].
algorithm that is not publicly known.5 When using the interface,
Facebook also provides advertisers with an “Estimated Daily Reach”,
which Facebook defines as the estimated number of users who
would be exposed to an ad given the targeting criteria and budget;
this feature helps advertisers with an understanding of how far
their budget will go for the selected audience. Although the bid
and cost control options are offered, without the knowledge of
the auction, they are difficult to set effectively, and therefore, it is
natural to only specify a budget and rely on Facebook to do the
bidding.
How the advertiser is actually charged for their ad campaign
depends on the objective. For “Reach", the advertiser is charged
per impression; for “Traffic" the advertiser is also charged per im-
pression unless the optimization is “Link Clicks" (in which case the
advertiser can choose to be charged per click if they wish).
Finally, if the advertiser chooses the “Reach" objective and
“Reach" optimization, they are allowed to specify a frequency cap,
which allows them to set the maximum number of impressions a
single user would see over a specified number of days. We use this
feature later in the paper to force Facebook to deliver our ads to
many users in our audience.
2.5 Ad review
Once the ad creation phase is complete, and before the ad enters
the ad delivery phase, it is submitted to Facebook for review.6 We
observed that most of our Facebook ads were approved within
30 minutes, some spent hours in review, and a few were never
approved. The criteria and internal mechanisms for approval are not
entirely clear, and precise reasons for why certain ads are rejected
are not given. In this work, we only report on experiments where
all necessary ads were approved before their scheduled start time.
2.6 Ad delivery
Ad platforms including Facebook commonly use ad auctions to
select which ads to show to users. Historically, this auction took
only the advertiser’s bid price into account; more recently, Facebook
considers other features such as the overall performance of the
ad and the platform’s estimate of how relevant the ad is to the
browsing user [21, 43]. Facebook says as much in its documentation
for advertisers [21]:
[W]e subsidize relevant ads in auctions, so more rele-
vant ads often cost less and see more results. In other
words, an ad that’s relevant to a person could win an
auction against ads with higher bids.
Facebook explains that it measures relevance as a composite of
estimated action rates ("[a]n estimate of whether a particular person
engages with or converts from a particular ad" and ad quality ("[a]
measure of the quality of an ad as determined from many sources
including feedback from people viewing or hiding the ad") [21].
5Facebook only says: “Facebook will aim to spend your entire budget and get the most
1,000 impressions using the lowest cost bid strategy" for the “Reach" campaign-level
objective, and “Facebook will aim to spend your entire budget and get the most link
clicks using the lowest cost bid strategy" for the “Traffic" campaign-level objective. An
optional “Bid Control" (maximum bid in each auction) and “Cost control" (the average
cost per link click) are also available for the “Reach" and “Traffic" campaign-level
objectives, respectively.
6Most platforms have a review process (consisting of a combination of automated and
manual review) to prevent abuse or violations of their advertising policies [2, 55].
In short, Facebook plays a significant role in determining which
users see which ads, based on its own judgment about which ads are
likely to be "relevant" to particular users, its own judgement of how
to bid on an advertiser’s behalf and distribute the specified budget
among auctions, and possibly other considerations connected to its
business interests. This role—in the context of political ads—is the
key phenomenon that this paper seeks to explore in its experiments.
2.7 Reporting
During the ad delivery phase, Facebook provides semi-live [4] de-
tailed statistics to advertisers about how their ad is being delivered.
In particular, Facebook reports the impressions (the number of times
the ad was shown), the reach (the number of unique users who saw
the ad), the clicks (the number of times users clicked on the ad), and
the spend (how much money was spent). Facebook also allows ad-
vertisers to obtain breakdowns of these performance metrics along
a few axes, most notably gender (broken into “Male”, “Female”, and
“Other”), age (broken down into brackets of 10 year increments), and
location (broken down into Designated Market Area [38], or DMA).
In other words, Facebook will tell advertisers how much they have
spent on users in different regions (or of different genders, etc.), and
how many clicks/impressions/reach those users represent. Notably
for this work, Facebook does not provide breakdowns along axes
such as Facebook’s estimated political leaning.
3 RELATEDWORK
We now provide a brief overview of related work on skew in ad
delivery, filter bubbles, and political advertising.
Skew in ad delivery Recently, concerns have been raised about
how the platforms’ desire to show “relevant” ads to users may raise
issues of lack of fairness and lack of transparency. Recent work [4,
34] demonstrated that on Facebook, ads can be showed to skewed
subsets of the target audience, sometimes with dramatic effects on
delivery (e.g., ads targeting the same audience but with different
content can be shown to over 95% women or less than 15% women,
depending only on the content of the ad and not on the advertiser’s
targeting choices or competition from other advertisers). In some
cases, skews in ad delivery may be unsurprising or desirable. In
others, such as civil rights areas and political ads, they can raise
serious issues that demand research and, potentially, regulation.
Online political advertising Prior work, conducted mostly
in the form of laboratory experiments, indicated high efficiency
of written persuasion personalized to the psychological profile
and motivation of the recipient [29, 56]. More recently, Matz et al.
conducted a large-scale experiment in which they showed that
Facebook ads tailored to individual’s psychological characteristics
yielded higher click-through and conversion rates compared to non-
personalized ads and mismatching ads [36]. Matz et al. relied on
the mechanism first documented by Kosinski et al.: that personality
traits of an individual can be accurately inferred from the content
that they “Like” on Facebook [32]. Other researchers, however,
pointed out that the unknown optimization mechanisms employed
by Facebook might obfuscate the measurement of effectiveness
of these personalized ads [11]. Our prior results [4] indicate that
Facebook does, indeed, further refine even precisely targeted audi-
ences, introducing demographic and political biases in the reached
audiences, beyond those intended by the advertiser.
Filter bubbles The extent, or even the existence, of the filter
bubble effect has been a point of contention both in academia and in
popular media. After the initial reports by Eli Pariser [39] scholars
have attempted to measure the phenomenon in services includ-
ing Google Search [24, 28], Google News [35], and Facebook [13].
However, the observed differences could often be explained by user
location differences (in the case of Google Search) or attributed
to an individual’s choice of friends to follow (in the case of Face-
book), rather than stemming from algorithmic personalization of an
individual’s experience. Furthermore, Bail et al. warn against over-
exposing users to messaging from politicians they do not support
as it appears to increase, rather than decrease their partisanship [6].
Other previous work indicated that the effect might be more
pronounced in ads than in organic content. Datta et al. showed
that personal attributes are used in ad selection, specifically that
changing one’s self-reported gender influences the job ads one
sees [10]. More recently, Ali et al. showed that the demographic
distribution of the audience that receives the ad changes depending
on the ad content, even if the same audience was targeted [4].
Our work provides further evidence that the filter bubble effect
is pronounced in the ads users are exposed to; we show that at-
tempting to “burst” the political advertising filter bubble can prove
expensive, especially for smaller advertisers. As far as we are aware,
we are the first to study the filter bubble effect due to ad deliv-
ery aspects of political messaging; prior work on filter bubbles for
political content focused on possibilities of disparate treatment
of organic rather than sponsored content or disparate treatment
during other parts of the process, such as during the ad review
stage [5, 33].
4 METHODOLOGY
In this work we aim to answer two related, but separate questions,
and design our experiments accordingly. First, we want to verify
whether the skew in delivery reported in previous work [4] exists
along the lines of political affiliation for political ads. To this end, we
replicate the study setup from [4] as closely as possible, including
setting the campaign objective to “Traffic”. Second, we ask whether
a political campaign determined to reach users who may not be
aligned with its views—and explicitly requesting such audience
from Facebook—can achieve their goal. To be able to better answer
this question, we set the campaign objective to “Reach”.
For the sake of clarity, we run ads for only one Democratic pres-
idential candidate (Bernie Sanders) and compare their performance
to that of the ads for only one Republican candidate (Donald Trump).
We choose these two candidates because at the time of experiment
design (early July 2019), they had spent most on Facebook adver-
tising among the major candidates of each party [14]. Therefore,
their election performance is least likely to be influenced by ads
run on our limited budget.
Next, we providemore details on the audiences and ad campaigns
in our experiments, how we measured their performance over time,
and the statistical apparatus necessary to interpret the results.
DMA(s) [38]
CAA CAB CAC CAD
Dem Rep Dem Rep Dem Rep Dem Rep
Greensboro, Charlotte 70,000 0 0 70,000 70,000 0 0 70,000
Wilmington, Raleigh-Durham,
Greenville-(New Bern and Spartanburg) 0 63,137 70,000 0 0 54,000 64,166 0
Table 1: Number of uploaded records for CustomAudiences created using publicly available voter records.We divide the DMAs
in the state into two sets, and create two audiences, each with voters registered with one party per DMA set (CAA and CAB ).
We repeated this process with separate voter records (creating CAC and CAD ), allowing us to run experiments on separate
audiences. The number of uploaded records does not match, as we uploaded records so that the Estimated Daily Reach was
the same.
4.1 Creating audiences
We use two mechanisms for targeting audiences on Facebook: Cus-
tom Audiences and detailed targeting.
Recall that we are interested in studying the skew in delivery
along political lines. Since Facebook does not provide ad delivery
breakdowns by political leaning, but does provide breakdowns by
location (Section 2.7), we craft our Custom Audiences in such a
way that the statistics about the political leanings of the actual
recipients of an ad can be inferred from the statistics about their
location. Specifically, we follow the method introduced by prior
work [4, 46].
Custom Audiences from voter records We obtained publicly
available voter records from North Carolina, which, in addition to
PII, include each voter’s political party registration (if one exists).
We then create Custom Audiences as follows:
(1) Divide the DMAs in North Carolina into two sets of roughly
equal population sizes.
(2) Create a Custom Audience that contains PII of registered
Democrats from the first set of DMAs and another Custom
Audience with PII of registered Republicans from the second.
(3) Upload the lists to Facebook, and compare their “Estimated
Daily Reach” statistics provided by Facebook.
(4) If one audience has a higher Estimated Daily Reach, subsam-
ple it and re-upload until the estimates match.
(5) Repeat steps (2)–(4) with the opposite assignment: regis-
tered Republicans from the first set of DMAs and registered
Democrats from the second set of DMAs.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the audiences created from
voter records.
There are two distinctions between our method and previous
work [4]. First, we introduce an additional step in an attempt to
create audiences consisting of roughly equal numbers of Democrats
and Republicans. We do so for ease and clarity of subsequent anal-
ysis; it is not strictly necessary to do so, as we will compare the
delivery of two ads targeting the same audience and run at the same
time to observe differences due to ad delivery (thus, any differences
in population, usage, or time of day will affect both campaigns
equally). Second, Facebook no longer provides advertisers with the
number of uploaded records that match Facebook users, as these
DMAs [38] CAE CAF
Trump Sanders Trump Sanders
donors donors donors donors
DMA Set 1 40,973 0 0 32,000
DMA Set 2 0 32,000 41,458 0
Table 2: Overview of Custom Audiences built from public
FEC donor records and ActBlue. The number of uploaded
records does not match, as we uploaded records so that the
Estimated Daily Reach was the same.
estimates have been shown to leak private information about indi-
viduals [51, 52]. Instead, we use the Estimated Daily Reach provided
by Facebookwith a budget set to a very high number (e.g., $1M/day),
thereby obtaining an estimate of the total daily active users in the
uploaded audience.
Custom Audiences from donor records We build separate
Custom Audiences from publicly available donor records for politi-
cal campaigns. The U.S. Federal Election Commission (FEC), in par-
ticular, makes publicly available the PII of all contributors who have
donated a total of $200 or more towards a political campaign [23].
We obtain data from the FEC for individuals who have donated to
the “Bernie 2020" or the “Donald J. Trump for President" committees
as of July 1, 2019 to craft Custom Audiences of users who actively
engage with these campaigns. Because there are fewer donors for
Bernie Sanders than for Donald Trump in FEC data, we also use
mid-year FEC filing by ActBlue, a popular Democratic fundraising
platform [7, 41] to obtain a list of Democratic donors who donated
less than $200. Since the FEC data isn’t limited to a particular state
or region, we randomly split all 210 U.S. DMA regions [38] into two
sets, and then create Custom Audiences of approximately equal
numbers of Democratic and Republican donors in each, by relying
on the estimated daily reaches (as in Steps (2)–(4)) above. Table 2
shows the size and configuration of our audiences created from
donor records.
Detailed targeting audiences Although the ability to create
Custom Audiences is only granted to advertisers with some history
of running and paying for ads (the exact eligibility criteria are not
publicly disclosed), all advertisers can specify their audience using
Figure 1: Ads used in our experiments concerning political issues and promoting candidates’ merchandise. The ads were copies
of real ads run on Facebook by the official campaigns, with the exception for Bernie Sanders related merchandise (as his store
has no official Facebook advertising).
detailed targeting (Section 2.2). We create a number of audiences
this way, selecting a geographic region centered around a town and
Facebook’s inferred characterization such as “Likely engagement
with US political content (Conservative)” and “Likely engagement
with US political content (Liberal)”. For some of the audiences we
further narrowed the targeting by specifying additional required
characteristics such as those who are, according to Facebook’s
characterization, “interested in” topics such as “Donald Trump
for President”, “Make America Great Again”, “Bernie Sanders”, or
“Elizabeth Warren”. We aimed to approximately match the sizes of
liberal and conservative audiences for each geographic region by
adjusting the targeting radius around a chosen location until the
Estimated Daily Reach matches. The Appendix presents the details
and size statistics for these audiences.
4.2 Creating ad copies
We ran three types of ads throughout our campaigns: (1) merchan-
dise ads for candidates that link to the candidates’ online campaign
stores, (2) “issues ads” that have detailed content and that link to
the candidates’ websites, and (3) “neutral” political ads that simply
encourage users to vote and link to generic voting information
websites.7 The majority of ads we ran were replicated from real
ads run by official political campaigns obtained from the Facebook
Ad Library [14]. Ads for Bernie Sanders’ merchandise store were
the only exception, as—unlike the other campaigns in question—
the Bernie Sanders campaign had not advertised merchandise on
Facebook; we created the ad creative for this ad. Whenever the
replicated ad was written in the first person, we changed it to be a
third person reference to the name of the candidate (as we were not
7https://www.usa.gov/election and https://www.usa.gov/register-to-vote
running the ads as the campaign itself). Examples of the ad copies
of types (1) and (2) that we ran are presented in Figure 1.
4.3 Isolating role of content
Most of our ads link directly to either a candidate’s official website
or generic voting information websites. In one of the experiments,
however, we wanted to isolate the effect that the content of the
advertised website has on the delivery skew, while keeping the
users’ reactions to the ad (such as possible Likes, comments, or
reactions) constant. We found that during ad creation, Facebook
would automatically crawl the destination link as part of the ad
review and classification process. We develop a methodology that
would use this feature to create ads that look like they have the
same content to users, but different content to Facebook.
To this end, we created a generic ad with a call to register to vote,
a picture of the American flag, and a link to a nondescript domain:
psdigital.info (see Figure 2). We created three copies of this ad,
with each copy having a destination link to a different page under
that domain. We configured our web server to deliver a different
response for requests for these pages based on the IP address of
the requestor. If the requestor was a Facebook-owned8 IP address,
we served a copy of the HTML9 from the official Trump campaign
website, the official Sanders campaign website, or a generic voting
information website,10 depending on the particular page under
our domain requested. Otherwise, if the requestor was from any
other IP address, the user would be immediately redirected to the
generic voting information website. In this way, all three ads would
8We determined Facebook IP addresses by using the IP address blocks advertised by
Autonomous Systems numbers owned by Facebook.
9Only the HTML code was served from our server; we modified the HTML so that
all images, JavaScript, and stylesheets would be downloaded from the corresponding
official websites.
10https://www.usa.gov/register-to-vote
Figure 2: Ads that have a destination link to our webserver
(psdigital.info), which serves HTML from the candidate
webpages to requests from Facebook’s IP addresses, but redi-
rects all other traffic to a generic voting information site.
The ads look identical to users, but different to Facebook.
appear identical to users (and those users would all be brought
to the same voting information site if they clicked on the ad), but
Facebook’s algorithm believed they linked to pages with different
political content.
4.4 Collecting performance statistics
As mentioned in Section 2.7, Facebook provides semi-live statistics
on how the ad is delivering. Once an ad starts running, we query
Facebook every five minutes in order to get these statistics over the
lifetime of the ad. For ads where we use Custom Audiences with
DMAs as a proxy for political leaning, we request these delivery
statistics be broken down by DMA.
4.5 Statistical analysis
The core questions in this work revolve around comparisons of the
fractions of Democrats (or Republicans) among the users exposed
to two ads that differ in their content. The comparison process
consists of two steps and is based on previous work [4].
First, we estimate the fraction of Democrats in each ad and the
99% confidence interval around that estimate as shown in Equa-
tion (1):
L.L. =
pˆ +
z2α /2
2n − zα/2
√
pˆ(1−pˆ)
n +
z2α /2
4n2
1 + z2α/2/n
,
U .L. =
pˆ +
z2α /2
2n + zα/2
√
pˆ(1−pˆ)
n +
z2α /2
4n2
1 + z2α/2/n
,
(1)
where L.L. is the lower confidence limit, U .L. is the upper confi-
dence limit, pˆ is the observed fraction of Democrats in the audience,
n is the total size of the audience exposed to the ad. To obtain the
99% interval we set zα/2 = 2.576.
Second, we compare whether the fractions in two scenarios are
statistically significantly different. If their confidence intervals do
not overlap (easily judged visually from the subsequent figures),
the difference is statistically significant. If the intervals do overlap,
we need to perform a difference of proportion test as shown in
Equation (2):
Z =
(pˆ1 − pˆ2) − 0√
pˆ(1 − pˆ)( 1n1 + 1n2 )
(2)
where pˆ1 and pˆ2 are the fractions of Democrats in the two audi-
ences, n1 and n2 are the total sizes of these audiences, and pˆ is
the fraction of Democrats in the two audiences combined. If the
resulting Z -score is above 2.576 (corresponding to 99% confidence)
the difference in proportion is statistically significant.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We now present the detailed set-ups and results of our experiments.
Recall that our aim is to study both (a) whether the content of a
political campaign’s ad could lead to skew in delivery along political
lines, and, if so, (b) whether a political campaign can successfully
reach users who Facebook believes are not aligned with the cam-
paign’s views. In the two subsections below, we address each of
these questions in turn, before discussing the implications and
limitations of our study.
5.1 Ad content and skew
We begin by examining whether the content of an ad can lead to
skew in delivery along political lines.
Voter records Similar to methodology of prior work [4] for
studying skews along race and gender, we use the Custom Au-
diences CAA, CAB , CAC , and CAD described in Table 1 that are
based on voter records. These audiences are designed so that asking
Facebook to report delivery statistics by DMA serves as a proxy for
obtaining delivery statistics by political affiliation.
We create three ad creatives: one taken from the official Donald
Trump campaign, another from the Bernie Sanders campaign (both
found in Facebook’s Ad Library [14], shown in Figure 1 and linking
to the respective campaign’s web site), and a “neutral” political ad
that simply encourages users to vote and links to a generic election
website.11 We then run one copy of each ad targeting each of the
four Custom Audiences, for a total of 12 individual ads. Our ads
are run with a daily budget of $20 per ad set and use the objective
“Traffic" and optimization “Link Clicks" (Section 2.3) as in prior
work [4].
Figure 3 (top row) presents the overall delivery statistics for these
three ads, with the delivery statistics of all four instances of each ad
aggregated together. We can immediately observe significant differ-
ences in delivery: The neutral ad delivers to 47% Democrats, while
the Trump ad delivers to less than 40% Democrats. The Sanders
ad, on the other hand, delivers to almost 70% Democrats. Note that
11https://www.usa.gov/election
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Figure 3: The estimated fraction of Democrats who were
shownour ads, targeting both registered voters inNorthCar-
olina andpolitical donor records. In the case of voter records,
the ad delivery to Democrats ranges from approximately
69% for Sanders’ ad to only 39% for the Trump’s ad. In the
case of donor records, we do not see statistically significant
differences in ad delivery.
this difference in delivery is despite the fact that all ads are run
from the same ad account, at the same time, targeting the same
audiences, and using the same goal, bidding strategy, and budget;
the only difference between them is the content and destination link
of the ad.
Donor records Having observed that delivery skew along polit-
ical lines can occur due to the content of the ad, we next turn to
examine whether that skew is amplified if we choose users who
recently engaged with politics. In particular, we examine whether
recent donors to political campaigns are estimated by Facebook to
have greater relevance for our ads, when compared to users who
are simply registered as Democratic or Republican voters. Thus,
we use our Custom Audiences of donor records (CAE and CAF ,
described in Table 2); however, due to the limited size of the donor
record databases, we are only able to run our experiment on two,
and not four, audiences. Thus, we run six ads in the same manner
as the experiment we just described.
The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 3 (bottom
row). Surprisingly, we do not find statistically significant differences
in the ad delivery between the three ads targeting political donors.
While we can only speculate as to why we observe a skew with
voter records but not with donor records, the absence of a skew
for the donor record audiences might suggest that Facebook does
not have sufficient information about these users to do accurate
relevance estimation for political ads.
Detailed targeting To further explore the role of Facebook’s use
of inferences about its users in delivery and its impact on political
ad skew, we next use audiences where we know that Facebook has
inferred the political affiliation of its users. We do so using detailed
targeting (Section 2.2), selecting attributes “Likely engagement with
US political content (Conservative)” for one audience and “Likely
engagement with US political content (Liberal)” for another. As
discussed in Section 4.1, we then geographically limit our targeting
to regions where we can ensure an approximately equal number of
users in each audience (as shown by Facebook’s audience size esti-
mates). Then, over a course of six hours we concurrently ran two
ad copies, each to two audiences (a total of four ads): one Sanders
ad targeting liberal users and another targeting conservative users,
and one Trump ad targeting liberal users and another targeting
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Figure 4: We ran merchandise and issue ads with two levels
of targeting specificity (Broad: users with “Likely engage-
ment with US political content (Conservative)” or “... (Lib-
eral)"; Narrow: additional detailed targeting for inferred in-
terest in Donald Trump or Bernie Sanders), and targeting
different regions (1: Celina, OH; 2:Dutchess, NY; 3: Lorain,
OH; 4:Macclenny, FL; 5:McCormick, SC; 6: Richlands, VA;
7: Saginaw, MI; 8: Slinger, WI). In all cases, Sanders’ ads de-
liver to a larger fraction of Democrats than Trump ads even
though they are targeting the same audiences at the same
time using the same budgets. The effect is more pronounced
for smaller audiences (compare, for example Merch, Broad,
3 and Merch, Broad, 6).
conservative users. For this, and all further experiments, we op-
timize for “Reach”, not “Traffic”. To calculate the delivery skew
of a politician’s ads, we sum reach across the two audiences, and
calculate the fraction of deliveries to the liberal audience.
The result of our first experiment is shown in the top row of
Figure 4. We can immediately observe similar skews in delivery
to the ones observed for voter records, with the content of the ad
causing delivery skew along political lines. This indirectly suggests
that our hypothesis for the reasons behind differences for voter vs
donor records could have some merit.
Next, we explore this finding in depth, varying three aspects of
our experiment:
(1) The size of the audience, as reported by Facebook’s Estimated
Daily Reach,
(2) The “specificity” of the audience (narrowing the detailed tar-
geting further by attributes such as users’ inferred interest in
“Donald Trump for President” or “Bernie Sanders” according
to Facebook), and
(3) The specific topic of the ad (adding ads that advertise small
campaign-branded merchandise that users can purchase, as
shown in Figure 1).
The results for these experiments are shown in Figure 4 (remaining
rows), with each row representing a separate experiment. Experi-
ments described as “issues” are run with the first two ad creatives
from Figure 1 and “merch” ads correspond to the third and fourth
creative in Figure 1.
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Figure 5: Delivery statistics for ads that look identical to
users, but appear partisan to the Facebook classification
mechanism. (A) The skew in delivery is consistent with
that observed in visibly distinct ads. (B) There is a financial
penalty for trying to show an ad that Facebook deems non-
aligned; reaching the same number of people in the same
audience is up to 1.5 times more expensive.
We make a number of observations from this experiment. First,
we observe statistically significant skews in ad delivery along polit-
ical lines for all of our ad configurations. This suggests that such
skew is a pervasive property of Facebook’s ad delivery system. Sec-
ond, we observe that the skews tend to be less pronounced when
the ads are targeting larger audiences (more than 10,000 daily ac-
tive users). While we do not know the underlying cause of this
phenomenon, we hypothesize that the larger audiences provide
the platform with a big enough pool of users to afford “relevant”
users regardless of their inferred political leaning. On the other
hand, we suspect that when running our ads with smaller audiences,
Facebook “exhausts” the (small) subset of users in the non-aligned
audience (e.g., Sanders advertising to a conservative audience) for
whom Facebook believes the ad is, in fact, relevant, and thus pauses
or raises the price for delivery, but continues the delivery among
the aligned audience. We explore this hypothesis in more detail in
the next experiment.
Overall, our findings strongly support our hypothesis that the
content of an ad could lead to skew in its delivery along political
lines whenever the platform has enough information (or thinks it
has enough information) about the political leanings of the users
being targeted, and that the skew is due to ad delivery optimiza-
tion algorithms run by Facebook, rather than to other factors. As
discussed in the introduction, this has profound implications for
political advertisers, users, and society.
5.2 Longitudinal delivery
We now explore what happens if a political campaign aims to reach
users who Facebook believes are not aligned with the campaign’s
views. Specifically, we “force” the Facebook ad platform to consider
showing ads to all users in the political advertiser’s targeting set,
including users for whom Facebook may believe the ad is not rele-
vant. We do so in two steps: First, on a small audience we measure
whether skew appears even if the ads look the same to users but
differently to Facebook. Second, we run near-copies of real ads of
political campaigns on a larger audience to measure the total ef-
fect. In both cases, we configure the campaigns using the objective
“Reach” and optimization “Reach”, which enables us to tell Facebook
to only show the ad once to each user each week, thus forcing the
delivery mechanism to ‘exhaust’ the audience rather than showing
the ad to the same subset of users.
Generic ads We begin by applying the method described in
Section 4.3, setting up ads that look identical to Facebook users
(Figure 2) and, when clicked, redirect the user to a governmental
website with instructions to register to vote. However, when visited
by Facebook’s web crawler, each ad’s landing website shows differ-
ent HTML: one serves Trump’s campaign HTML, another Sanders’,
and a third a generic voting information site. Since all ads look
identical to users, any skew can only be attributed to Facebook’s
optimization based on the content of the linked website.
Each ad copy is targeted at four audiences: two that are Broad
and two that are Narrow. The Broad audiences target “Likely en-
gagement with political content (Liberal)” and “...Conservative”,
and the Narrow audiences additionally target users with interest in
Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, respectively. Table 3 entries for
Oxford, NC and Scranton, PA provide detailed audience parameters
and size statistics for the Broad and Narrow audiences respectively.
Since we are attempting to reach everyone in the targeting set here,
we set a higher budget $40 per day for each ad. These ads were run
for two days and did not fully exhaust the audiences. The results
of this experiment are presented in Figure 5A. Even though the
users see the same ad in all three cases, and therefore their explicit
or implicit reactions to them are not more different than chance,
the delivery is still skewed according to what Facebook’s crawler
sees. We also present the price differentiation in Figure 5B. For a
given audience, we measure how much it cost for the aligned ad
to reach the same number of users as the non-aligned ad did. For
example, it cost 1.5× more for the ad linking to Sanders’ campaign
page (as perceived by Facebook) to reach the same number of users
in the Broad conservative audience than the ad linking to Trump’s
campaign page. Conversely, it cost 1.2× more for the ad linking to
Trump’s campaign page to reach the same number of people in the
Broad liberal audience than the ad linking to Sanders’ campaign
page.
These results show that the contents of the destination link—
and not users’ reaction or engagement with the ad—play a role in
Facebook’s decision for skewed delivery and differential pricing.
An implication of this finding is that two campaigns running an ad
about the same issue to the same target audience might reach differ-
ent fractions of that audience and at different prices, only because
the destination links are different. This differential delivery and
pricing may be particularly damaging for local political campaigns,
where candidates may agree on some issues but not others.
Real ads We now turn to explore how this effect plays out for
real-world ads that differ in content and destination link. In this
experiment, we run three ads (Trump, Sanders, and neutral issue
ads as before), each to two Narrow audiences over a period of seven
days and with a daily budget of $100 for each ad and audience
combination.12 The ad copies are the first two presented in Figure 1,
and details about the target audiences are provided in Table 3 (the
audiences from Michigan and Wisconsin). The conservative and
liberal audiences were selected such that they had approximately
12Our total spend over the week ended up being $4,228.19 distributed roughly equally
among Sanders, Trump, and neutral ads.
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Figure 6: Ads for a political campaign deliver tomore users and for a lower cost if the targeted users have the same partisanship.
A and B - the delivery rates are the highest in the beginning of the ad runtime and for aligned audiences. C and D - the cost
of reaching non-aligned audiences is higher, especially in the beginning of the experiment. E and F - the more people have
already seen the ad, the more expensive it becomes to show it to even more people; that growth is log-linear (see F). G and H
show the ratio between the cost of a political campaign advertising to a non-aligned audience and their competitor advertising
to the same audience.
the same daily active reach, and such that we expected our ads to
have reached almost everybody in the audience by the end of the
seven days.
The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 6. We first
focus on panel A, which shows the cumulative number of users
reached over seven days (along with its derivative in panel B). We
can observe that the delivery increases rapidly for all ads during the
first day and then slows down quickly. However, we can observe
two notable outliers in panel A: the Trump ad targeting the liberal
audience and the Sanders ad targeting the conservative audience.
Both of these non-aligned ads end up delivering to over 25% fewer
users than their aligned counterparts. In other words, when the
Trump ad is advertised to the conservative audience, it delivers to
a total of 21,792 users; when the Sanders ad is run at the same time
and targeted to the same conservative audience, it delivers to only
17,964 users. Note that this difference cannot be attributed to some
unknown underlying difference between Facebook use between
the users categorized as liberal and conservative by Facebook be-
cause the neutral ad delivers equally to liberals and conservatives,
reaching approximately 23,000 users.
We turn to panel C, which shows the cumulative cost per thou-
sand unique users to help explain why this is occurring. We can
immediately notice an increasing cost trend for all ads: as the ads
run longer, their cost increases substantially. Presumably, this is
because Facebook first delivers the ad to the “cheaper” users in the
target audience before deciding to spend our budget on the more
“expensive" users. However, we can observe that the non-aligned
ads are again outliers here: both show a substantially higher cost
per thousand users, a difference noticeable from the first day of the
experiment. By the end of the experiments, when the liberal ad is
shown to the liberal audience, it is charged $21 per thousand users;
when the conservative ad is delivered to the same audience, it is
charged over $40 per thousand users.
Because the delivery rates slow down after the first day plots C
and D make the growth of cost per 1,000 also appear to slow down.
Therefore, we turn to plots E and F, which show this growth as
a function of the size of reached audience, rather than time. We
observe that the growth is rapid, and the running cost per 1,000
is growing exponentially as a function of the number of users
reached. Finally, in plots G and H we show that the ratio between
the cost a political campaign pays to show their ad to the non-
aligned audience and the cost of their competitor showing to the
same audience is relatively stable, between 2:1 and 4:1.
Overall, Figure 6 emphasizes three findings: First, the penalty
for reaching a non-aligned audience remains at a relatively stable
ratio between 2:1 and 4:1 as a function of audience already reached
(see Figure 6H). Second, that while the cost per thousand view-
ers grows linearly with time (Figure 6D), it grows super-linearly
with the number of users already reached (Figure 6F). For example,
panel F shows that the cost of showing the Sanders ad to the first
1,000 liberal users (solid blue line) is approximately $5, and the
cost of reaching the first 1,000 conservative users with this ad is
approximately $10. However, once 10,000 users in each of these
audiences are already reached, reaching another thousand of liberal
users costs approximately $15 (a three-fold increase) and reaching
another thousand of conservative users costs approximately $37
1 2 3 4
0
10
20
30
40
Cu
m
ula
tiv
e 
co
st
pe
r 1
00
0 
us
er
s
Oxford, NC
5 10 15
0
10
20
30
40
Richlands, VA
1 2 3 4
Users reached [thousands]
1.0
1.5
2.0
Cu
m
ula
tiv
e
co
st 
ra
tio
5 10 15
Users reached [thousands]
1.0
1.5
2.0
Figure 7: The price penalty for showing to non-aligned au-
dience is not just an effect of a particular location or tar-
geting more “extreme” (Narrow) audiences. Findings from
Figure 6 hold also in other cities and with weaker targeting
(here: only political alignment,without additional interests).
We note that in some cities Trump’s ads are cheaper for his
aligned audience than Sanders’ ads are for his.
(nearly a four-fold increase compared to the first thousand conser-
vatives). Third, at the end of the experiment, both neutral ads and
the two aligned partisan ads reached over 20,000 users, while the
non-aligned ads reached significantly fewer. This demonstrates the
core phenomenon: it is cheaper and more effective for a political
campaign to reach audiences that are politically aligned (as inferred
by Facebook) with their agenda, and as the campaign progresses it
becomes more expensive to reach additional viewers.
Finally, we run a similar experiment targeting Broad audiences
(i.e., audiences without specific interest in candidates). The results
of this experiment are presented in Figure 7. We find that the core
phenomenon holds there as well, and note that in some cases, the
conservative audience is cheaper for Trump than the liberal audi-
ence is for Sanders.
5.3 Limitations
We now discuss limitations of our study and briefly mention the
steps we took to mitigate them when possible. Controlling for all
possible variables that may affect political ad delivery is beyond
the scope and financial capabilities of our work, and is better suited
to be performed by Facebook itself or by an independent third-
party auditor that would be granted broader data and algorithms’
access than what is available through the ad interface. Similarly, it is
important to note that we can only report on delivery skew that we
observed for our own ads; we cannot draw any conclusions about
how political ads in general (or all ads run by a particular campaign)
are delivered. Nonetheless, the fact that we observe strong and
statistically significant effects in our small set of ads suggests that
the potential negative outcomes for individuals, political campaigns,
and society in the context of ad delivery optimization of political
advertising are not mere hypotheticals and warrant further scrutiny
(Section 6).
Role of advertiser’s identity We have repeated a subset of
our experiments using another advertising account registered as
an advertiser in the area of “Social Issues, Elections, and Politics”
and linked to a Facebook page unrelated to the first. Our results
were quantitatively and qualitatively similar. This suggests that
the effects we observed were not tied to our particular advertising
account. Nevertheless, we do not make any statements about the
extent to which the observed effects hold when run by real political
campaigns with a more established history than ours.
Role of budget We also re-ran a subset of our experiments with
varying lifetime budgets ranging from $10–$100 per campaign, and
with a generous bid cap of $10 in each auction. Our ads ran on
consecutive weekdays at similar times; we observed qualitatively
similar skews regardless of the budget. Although $100 per ad may
seem small compared with the total political ad spending, such
ads are representative of practice: recent work [12] that analyzes
data from Facebook’s political ad archive has found that 82% of all
political ads spend less than $100.
Role of competition We ran each pair of campaigns targeting a
particular audience representing two different political campaigns
at the same time and with the same budget. Such a set-up is de-
signed to ensure that both campaigns have the same users available
for delivery (i.e., if run at different times, the skews could be attrib-
uted to different Facebook use patterns by liberals or conservatives)
and both are experiencing the same competition from other ad-
vertisers (i.e., that it would not be the case that one campaign is
under-performing because it happened to run at the same time that
another large and wealthy advertiser was targeting those users,
whereas another campaign avoided such a collision). Thus, run-
ning campaigns simultaneously is an effective strategy to isolate
the effects of delivery optimization from other extraneous factors.
However, to verify that the skews are not merely the effect of our
ads competing with each other, we also re-ran a subset of campaigns
separately. The qualitative and quantitative skew effects for those
campaigns we similar.
Audience sizes We aimed to match our constructed liberal and
conservative audiences in size as closely as possible, but thematches
are inevitably imprecise as Facebook only provides estimates of daily
reach13 rather than audience sizes.
User engagement with our ads There are a number of ways
users can engage with the ads we present, each of which poten-
tially influences future delivery and pricing: reactions (‘like’, ‘love’,
‘haha’, ‘wow’, ‘sad’, ‘angry’), commenting, and sharing. Facebook
advertising interface reports all such engagements. Additionally,
Facebook might be collecting and using telemetric information; for
example, how long each user spent looking at the ad. This tele-
metric information is not available to the advertisers (and thus,
neither to us), but might still play a role in ad delivery optimization
algorithms.
13https://www.facebook.com/business/help/1691983057707189?helpref=faq_content
Some of our ads received reactions, comments, and re-shares
from the users they were delivered to. We note four important,
related observations, that emphasize that our findings about skew
in delivery and differential pricing are not merely a function of the
ad delivery algorithm’s use of user engagement. First, we observe
consistent skew and price differences in ads that look identical to
users, yet trick Facebook into classifying them as partisan (Fig-
ure 5). Users do not react differently to ads that appear identical,
and, therefore, the entire observed difference can be attributed to
Facebook’s pre-delivery classification (and some random effects).
Second, we observe consistent skew in delivery of ads that had
virtually no engagement since they were run on small budgets and
only for a few hours, as shown in Figure 4. Third, longitudinal ads
with neutral content proved less engaging than either aligned or
not-aligned ads, yet they eventually reached larger audiences and
at lower prices (Figure 6). Specifically, non-aligned ads were shared
at higher rates than neutral ads (0.34% vs 0.03% for conservative
audience, 0.19% vs 0.05% for the liberal audience). This leads us to
believe that the relatively lower costs of aligned ads compared to
non-aligned ads do not stem from “free” exposures originating from
re-shares. Finally, we do find a negative correlation between the
fraction of positive reactions (“like” and “love”) among all reactions
and the price in the longitudinal ads with ρ = −0.91, pval = 0.01.
Taken together, our work demonstrates although the skew in deliv-
ery as well as differential pricing can be further amplified during
the course of delivery by users’ reactions, the primary reason stems
from Facebook’s ad delivery optimization’s use of classification of
an ad and its landing page content.
We leave a more precise quantification of the influence of users’
interactions with the ads on Facebook’s ad delivery and pricing
algorithms to future work.
6 DISCUSSION
Our findings suggest that Facebook is wielding significant power
over political discourse through its ad delivery algorithms without
public accountability or scrutiny.
Implications First, Facebook limits political advertisers’ abil-
ity to reach audiences that do not share those advertisers’ politi-
cal views in ways that are significantly different from traditional
broadcast media. The existence and extent of this skew may not be
apparent to advertisers and varies based on their ad’s message and
the destination link used by the campaign. For example, a campaign
targeting a certain geographic region might reasonably expect to
reach an audience whose political views are representative of users
in the region. To discover otherwise would require careful research,
as we have demonstrated in this study. Furthermore, the strength
of delivery skews vary for campaigns of different political lean-
ings and targeting different populations, making digital advertising
inequitable for political campaigns with identical budgets.
Second, recent moves to restrict political advertisers’ targeting
options [16, 26, 48], although valuable from a user privacy per-
spective [22, 31, 46], might be undermined by the operation of ad
delivery algorithms, and even give companies like Facebook more
control over selecting which users see which political messages.
This selection occurs without the users’ or political advertisers’
knowledge or control. Moreover, these selection choices are likely
to be aligned with Facebook’s business interests, but not necessarily
with important societal goals.
Third, today, researchers, regulators, and campaigns lack access
to algorithms and data required for a more thorough study of ad
delivery skews and their likely impacts. In particular, although
much has already been said about the inadequacy of current ad
transparency tools provided by ad platforms [19, 37, 50], our work
draws attention to the need to expand these efforts to account for
ad delivery algorithms as well.
Policy analysis Today, U.S. law cannot do much, if anything,
to directly change how ad platforms deliver political ads. For the
foreseeable future, it is likely that the primary regulator of digital
political advertising will not be the government, but rather ad
platforms themselves.
The U.S. Congress has addressed conceptually similar "ad deliv-
ery issues" in the past, albeit in a different domain. For example, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) enforces the so-called
Equal-Time Rule [1], which originated in 1927 in response to wor-
ries that broadcast licensees could unduly influence the outcome of
elections. The rule requires that licensees make air time available
to all candidates for the same office on equivalent terms. However,
the rule only applies to broadcast licensees, and has only narrowly
survived constitutional scrutiny in part because it implicates gov-
ernment interests in managing limited broadcast spectrum [8].
Prevailing interpretations of the First Amendment are likely to
block efforts to extend the logic of the Equal-Time Rule to digital ad-
vertising platforms, which are not regulated like broadcast licensees.
As an initial matter, the First Amendment strongly protects political
speech, and generally tolerates only narrowly-tailored government
regulations [30]. This protection is so strong that legal scholars
cannot even be confident that lighter-touch kinds of regulations—
for example, a requirement that social media users be entitled to
opt-in to micro-targeted political advertising—would survive con-
stitutional scrutiny. Moreover, the Supreme Court recently declared
that “the creation and dissemination of information" constitutes
speech under the First Amendment [45]. This reasoning, which
might expand the “commercial free speech” rights of companies,
creates some uncertainty about the government’s ability to restrict
corporations’ use of data in the context of digital advertising.
Looking ahead, it is clear that government regulation of digital
political advertising is on firmest legal footing when it requires dis-
closure about who is speaking to whom, when, and about what [30].
Accordingly, Congress and the FEC can consider transparency re-
quirements that will enable detailed auditing and research about
ad targeting and the delivery of political ads.
Mitigations As an initial data, the public and the campaign
managers need more information about the operation of ad delivery
algorithms and their real-world effects. Ad platforms could increase
transparency around political ads (including key metrics such as
targeting criteria, detailed ad metadata, ad budgets, and campaign
objectives) to enable further study of the effects of ad targeting
and delivery. And they could provide access to and insight into
the ad delivery algorithms themselves (including those involved
in running the auction, relevance measurement and estimation,
and bid and budget allocation on advertisers’ behalf), allowing
third parties greater ability to study and audit their performance
and effect on political discourse. Without these and similar steps,
policymakers and the public will be unable to formulate appropriate
responses.
Ad platforms could also disable delivery optimization for po-
litical content, or a least allow advertisers to do so. They could
also introduce more nuanced user-facing controls for political con-
tent delivery and expand public ad archives to make them more
accessible and usable by everyone.
Finally, we call on ad platforms to acknowledge the central role
they play in the delivery of political ads, and to collaborate with
other key stakeholders—including researchers, political campaigns,
journalists, law, policy and political philosophy scholars—to address
that role when it is not aligned with public interests.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank Dean Eckles and David Lazer for their in-
valuable insights. We are also extremely grateful to the participants
and organizers of the REAL ML workshop for their encouragement
and constructive feedback. This work was done, in part, while Alek-
sandra Korolova was visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory
of Computing, where she benefited from supportive feedback from
participants of the Privacy and Fairness programs, and particularly,
from the suggestions of Amos Beimel and Kobbi Nissim. This work
was funded in part by a grant from the Data Transparency Lab, NSF
grants CNS-1616234, CNS-1916020, and CNS-1916153, and Mozilla
Research Grant 2019H1.
ERRATA
v3: Clarified the discussion on efficacy of personality-based target-
ing.
v2: We clarified the optimization goal used in the experiments:
Traffic in experiments with donors and registered voters and Reach
in all other experiments.
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Location Targeting Size
Celina, OH
(+25 mi)
Engagement: liberal
Interests: Bernie Sanders 1,500
Celina, OH
(+21 mi)
Engagement: conservative
Interests: Donald Trump for President 1,400
Dutchess
County, NY Engagement: liberal 15,000
Dutchess
County, NY Engagement: conservative 15,000
Loraine, OH
(+13 mi) Engagement: liberal 20,000
Loraine, OH
(+10 mi) Engagement: conservative 22,000
Macclenny, FL
(+24 mi)
Engagement: liberal
Interests: Bernie Sanders 8,500
Macclenny, FL
(+30 mi)
Engagement: conservative
Interests: Donald Trump for President 8,300
McCormick, SC
(+20 mi) Engagement: liberal 3,000
McCormick, SC
(+17 mi) Engagement: conservative 3,400
Richlands, VA
(+34 mi), VA Engagement: liberal 5,000
Richlands, VA
(+10 mi), VA Engagement: conservative 5,000
Saginaw, MI
(+10 mi) Engagement: liberal 13,000
Saginaw, MI
(+10 mi) Engagement: conservative 13,000
Slinger, WI
(+21 mi)
Engagement: liberal
Interests: Bernie Sanders, U.S. Senator Bernie
Sanders
2,900
Slinger, WI
(+24 mi)
Engagement: conservative
Interests: Donald Trump for President 3,100
Michigan
Engagement: liberal
Interests: Democratic Party (United States),
Bernie Sanders, U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders,
Joe Biden, Barack Obama
34,000
Wisconsin
and Michigan
Engagement: conservative
Interests: Donald Trump for President, Re-
publican Party (United States), Make America
Great Again or Mike Pence
38,000
Oxford, NC
(+12 mi) Engagement: liberal 3,000
Oxford, NC
(+10 mi) Engagement: conservative 3,600
Scranton, PA
(+45 mi)
Engagement: liberal
Interests: Bernie Sanders, Democratic Party
(United States), U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders,
Barack Obama, Joe Biden
3,000
Scranton, PA
(+50 mi)
Engagement: conservative
Interests: Donald Trump for President, Make
America Great Again
3,200
Table 3: Overview of the audiences created using Facebook’s
inferred interests. The targeting parameters are chosen so
that the number of conservative and liberal users in au-
diences corresponding to a particular location are roughly
equal. Interests are combined together to narrow audiences
down (i.e. with a logical AND), except for theWisconsin and
Michigan audience, where one OR clause is used.
APPENDIX
Audiences from Facebook’s targeting attributes. Table 3
shows the geographical location, targeting parameters, and esti-
mated potential reach given by Facebook. In each case, the geo-
graphical diameter and targeting specificity is tweaked to have
roughly equal sized liberal and conservative audiences.
